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Modeling Item-Level Data With Item
Response Theory
Michael J. Zickar^
Department of Psychology, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, Ohio
Psychology can be separated
into two camps, a substantive
camp that is primarily interested in
understanding important aspects
of human behavior and thought
and a methodological camp that is
primarily interested in developing
tools that will be used by the sub-
stantive researchers to answer dif-
ficult questions. Ideally, the two
camps should have much cross-
fertilization, and the lines between
them should be blurred. However,
complex theories are often con-
structed before appropriate meth-
ods are developed for testing the
hypotheses. Additionally, quanti-
tative psychologists often develop
techniques that might be difficult
and impractical to apply initially to
real-data problems. These novel
techniques need to be refined
through robustness studies and
analytical work before they can be
used with real-world data. A psy-
chometric framework called item
response theory (IRT) has under-
gone such prudent testing and re-
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finement and is now ready to be
implemented into the mainstream
of psychological research and prac-
tice.
IRT has already had a major
impact on educational testing
through its impact on computer-
ized adaptive testing (CAT). The
precision of IRT-based item statis-
tics allows computerized testing
programs to choose items that pro-
vide maximum psychometric in-
formation for an individual exam-
inee. This process allows adaptive
tests to maintain measurement pre-
cision similar to that of conven-
tionally administered tests even
though fewer items are adminis-
tered. In the 1990s, Educational
Testing Service (ETS) implemented
a CAT version of the Graduate Rec-
ord Examination (GRE). ETS plans
to phase out conventional paper-
and-pencil administration of the
GRE General test and administer
only CAT versions by fall 1999. The
success of adaptive testing would
not be possible without develop-
ment of IRT. In the future, it is
likely that IRT will yield progress
not only by improving measure-
ment technologies, but also by
making contributions in substan-
tive areas, such as decision-making
theory.
This article begins by explaining
two fundamental concepts of IRT,
the item response function and
item information. Next, the flexibil-
ity of IRT is highlighted to demon-
strate the types of data that can be
modeled. Einally, the present and
future impact of IRT on both prac-
tical and theoretical issues in psy-
chology is discussed.
TWO BASIC CONCEPTS
OF IRT
Psychologists typically use
many of the techniques developed
through classical test theory (CTT)
to evaluate tests and scales used in
research and practice. Concepts
such as reliability, item-total corre-
lations, and the Spearman-Brown
prophecy formula are all based on
the CTT model, which posits that
the observed scale score is a func-
tion of a true score and an error
term. Many limitations of this
framework have been noted. Eirst,
the CTT model focuses on scale-
level measurement. The true score
is explicitly linked to a particular
instrument. Therefore, an indi-
vidual's true score for one math-
ematical reasoning test is different
from his or her true score for an-
other mathematical reasoning test.
Second, CTT does not allow for
much precision in testing specific
hypotheses about the measure-
ment properties of scales. In CTT,
each scale has a reliability that is
used to characterize the measure-
ment precision of the entire test.
This concept fails to recognize that
tests have differential capabilities
in discriminating among different
levels of examinees' abilities. Eor
example, a mathematics test com-
posed primarily of calculus items
will be able to differentiate indi-
viduals high in math ability from
those with average or below-
average skills; this test, however,
would not provide much differen-
tiation between those of low ability
and those of average ability. To ap-
preciate the power of IRT and some
of its advantages over CTT, it is
necessary to discuss two basic con-
cepts.^
Item Response Function
IRT relates characteristics of
items and characteristics of indi-
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CUKUrNT IVRECriONS IN l'S^CI KU.OGIC.M. SCIl NCC
viduals to the probability of affirm-
ing, endorsing, or correctly an-
swering individual items. The
cornerstone of IRT is the item re-
sponse junction (IRE). This function
is a nonlinear regression of the
probability of affirming item i on a
latent trait, 6, which represents the
characteristic measured by the
scale items (e.g., mathematical abil-
ity, extroversion, job satisfaction).
Eigure 1 presents a graphic repre-
sentation of three IRFs.
There are many different forms
of this regression line. Eor dichoto-
mously scored items (e.g., right vs.
wrong or true vs. false), the two-
parameter logistic model (2PL) and
the three-parameter logistic model
(3PL) are commonly used. The for-
mula for the 3PL model is
,.=lie)=c, 1
. + e
where the probability that a person
with a latent trait, 9, affirms an
item I (i.e., u,- = 1) is a function of
three parameters: a,, a discrimina-
tion parameter that determines the
slope of the IRE; b,, a location pa-
rameter that determines the area of
the 6 continuum in which the IRF is
most steep; and c,, a pseudoguess-
ing parameter that determines the
probability that a respondent with
an extremely low 6 will endorse the
item. The probability of affirming
items with large a parameters var-
ies sharply as a function of 6,
whereas the probability of affirm-
ing items with low a parameters
varies weakly as a function of 6.
Items with low a parameters are
generally considered poor items.
Items with large positive b param-
eters will be endorsed only by re-
spondents with large positive 9s,
whereas items with large negative
b parameters will be endorsed by
everyone except people with the
most extreme negative 9s. The c
parameter introduces a nonzero
lower asymptote to the IRE so that
respondents with large negative 9s
will have a nonzero probability of
affirming the item; this nonzero as-
ymptote may result from guessing
or other processes. The 2PL for-
m.ula is a submodel of the 3PL for-
1.0
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Item1: a = 1.0, b = 0.0, c = 0.25; Item 2: a = 1.0, b = 0.0, c = 0.0
Item 3: a = 0.60, b = -1.5, c = 0.0
Fig. 1. Item response functions for three hypothetical items.
mula and can be obtained by set-
ting the c parameter to zero. This
model has the implicit assumption
that people with the lowest 6 val-
ues will have a zero probability of
affirming the item. An even sim-
pler model, the Rasch model, is ob-
tained by setting the a parameter to
be constant across all items. Each of
these models assumes that each
item is measuring only one 9 di-
mension.
The first hypothetical item pre-
sented in Eigure 1 has a = 1.0,
which is an average level of dis-
crimination; b = 0.0, which is an av-
erage difficulty; and c = .25, which
suggests that even individuals with
extremely low ability have a 25%
chance of answering the item cor-
rectly. Item 2 has the same dis-
crimination and difficulty as Item
1; however, c = 0.0, suggesting that
there is no guessing occurring with
this item. As can be seen in Figure
1, the lower asymptote of the IRF
for Item 2 is at 0.0. Finally, Item 3 is
of lower discrimination {a = 0.60)
and of lower difficulty {b = -1.5)
than the previous two items. This
item has c = 0.0; if the 9 axis were
extended further, the IRF would
eventually reach 0.0. By plotting
the IRFs, researchers can compare
the functioning of items, determine
the extent of guessing, and deter-
mine the range of 9 in which an
item is most discriminating.
Information
Another key IRT concept is in-
jormation, which is used to quantify
measurement precision. The infor-
mation value for each item is com-
puted on the basis of the IRF. The
formula for item information is
where P(u, = 119) is the first de-
rivative (i.e., slope) of the IRF at a
particular value of 9.
Copyright © 1998 American Psychological Society
The standard error of 9 can be
computed directly from the item
information function as follows:
1
As can be seen in this equation, the
standard error of measurement as
conceptualized in IRT is condi-
tioned on the level of 9. Unlike
CTT, IRT allows measurement pre-
cision to vary across different re-
gions of the measurement scale.
Figure 2 presents the informa-
tion function for each of the three
previously presented items. Sev-
eral important observations can be
made about the information func-
tion. First, information is maxi-
mized near where 9 equals the
value of the b parameter of each
item. The functions for Items 1 and
2 have more information near the
middle of the 0 distribution than
does the function for Item 3, which
has its information maximized in
the negative range of the 9 con-
tinuum. This difference illustrates
an interesting point: Items differ in
their usefulness depending on the
purpose. Item 3, which has a much
lower discrimination parameter
than Items 1 and 2, might be pre-
ferred if the purpose is to estimate
the e of a person with low ability
because that item has a higher
amount of information at the low
end of the 9 continuum. A second
important observation, that guess-
ing reduces information, can be
seen by examining the difference
between information functions for
Item 1 and Item 2. Item 2 has
greater information at all regions of
the 9 continuum, and especially at
the lower regions of the 9 con-
tinuum, where guessing will be
prevalent among respondents. This
decrease in the amount of informa-
tion highlights the negative effects
that guessing has on measurement
precision.
Computer adaptive tests work
by administering items with large
amounts of information near the
region where 9 is most likely to be.
The ability estimate is revised after
.8-
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Fig. 2. Item information functions for three hypothetical items. See Figure 1 for the
item parameters.
each item response, and then a
computer algorithm selects the
next item to present on the basis of
the information level of items at the
revised ability estimate. By choos-
ing only items with large amounts
of information, adaptive tests can
maintain measurement precision at
the levels of conventional tests
even though fewer items are ad-
ministered.
EXPANDING THE
DOMAIN
Two unfounded criticisms of
IRT are that IRT models are ca-
pable of modeling only items that
measure cognitive ability and that
IRT is incapable of modeling items
that are not dichotomously scored.
IRT models have been developed
primarily with cognitive-ability
items having clear right and wrong
answers. These types of items lend
themselves well to dichotomous
scoring. However, dichotomous
IRT models can be used for items
that have two options, even though
neither option is considered more
correct than the other. For example,
personality items that ask the re-
spondent whether a particular de-
scription "describes yourself" or
"does not describe yourself" can be
modeled with dichotomous mod-
els. Dichotomous IRT models have
been used to model items in di-
verse fields, such as personality
(Zickar & Drasgow, 1996), drug-
use screening (Kirisci, Tarter, &
Hsu, 1994), and attitudes toward
work (Roznowski, 1989).
In recent years, much of the ba-
sic research in IRT has focused on
developing models for more com-
plicated item types, such as items
with more than two response op-
tions (i.e., polytomous items) and
items that measure more than one
dimension. Roznowski (1989), ana-
lyzing the Job Descriptive Index
(JDI), collapsed a three-option re-
Published by Cambridge University Press
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sponse format into a dichotomous
response scale because polytomous
IRT was relatively unknown and
untested at that time. She predicted
that "algorithms that allow . . .
analysis of [polytomous] JDI data
using such methods likely will be
forthcoming" (p. 813). She was cor-
rect.
Polytomous Models
Polytomous models are appro-
priate when items are not dichoto-
mously scored and when the at-
tractiveness of options differs for
respondents of differing 9 levels.
The main difference between poly-
tomous and dichotomous models
is that IRFs are replaced by option
response functions (ORFs). An
ORF explicitly relates 9 to the prob-
ability of choosing a particular op-
tion instead of the probability of
answering an item correctly.
There are two classes of polyto-
mous models. Models in the first
class, denoted graded models, as-
sume an a priori ordering of op-
tions in terms of valence, so that
Option 1 has a more negative va-
lence than Option 2, and Option 3
has a more positive valence than
Options 1 and 2. This model is ap-
propriate with Likert-type scales
(e.g., when response options are
"disagree," "neither agree nor dis-
agree," "agree"), which are preva-
lent in personality and attitude
measurement. An example of a
graded model is Samejima's
Graded Response Model (Same-
jima, 1969).
The other class of polytomous
models, denoted nominal models,
assumes no a priori ordering of re-
sponse options within an item. An
example of a nominal model is
Bock's Nominal Model (Bock,
1972). A nominal model might be
most appropriate for cognitive-
ability items for which the incor-
rect options may imply different
degrees of "wrongness," but often
the test maker cannot identify the
degree of wrongness without look-
ing at the data in a pilot sample.
For example, on a vocabulary test,
one of the wrong answers may be
more similar in meaning to the cor-
rect answer than other wrong an-
swers are. For most personality
tests, nominal models are probably
inappropriate.
Polytomous models provide
two advantages to researchers.
First, these models can handle
more flexible item types. Often
(e.g., Roznowski, 1989) polyto-
mous response scales are collapsed
so that dichotomous models can be
used. This is bad practice because
the model used to analyze the data
does not match the original re-
sponse scale. Second, polytomous
models can extract more informa-
tion than dichotomous models
used on the same items. This in-
creased information helps improve
the precision of 9 estimates. Given
these two advantages, polytomous
IRT has been an important addi-
tion to the IRT toolbox.
Multidimensional IRT
The previously mentioned IRT
models all assume that the latent
trait, 9, is the only individual deter-
minant of item responses. If this
prescription were to be taken liter-
ally, the models could be used to
analyze only scales with strict uni-
dimensionality. However, Dras-
gow and Parsons (1983) demon-
strated that deviations from strict
unidimensionality will not destroy
the fidelity of these models as long
as an appropriate factor analysis
demonstrates that the first factor
has a much larger eigenvalue than
secondary factors. Unfortunately,
many psychological constructs,
such as personality traits, may
have higher levels of multidimen-
sionality than the levels Drasgow
and Parsons found acceptable. For
these multidimensional constructs.
IRT models that assume unidimen-
sionality will not fit the data.
Recent work has focused on de-
veloping multidimensional IRT
models (see Reckase, 1997). These
techniques can be useful for mod-
eling complex items, such as math-
ematical story problems, which re-
quire both quantitative and verbal
skills. However, these techniques
still require more work before they
will be integrated into substantive
research areas frequently. Future
work with multidimensional IRT
will focus on developing polyto-
mous IRT models and also on mak-
ing estimation programs more
user-friendly. This work is impor-
tant because it will help break
through another limitation.
IRT-BASED TOOLS
Some of the most important con-
sequences of IRT are the psycho-
metric tools that rely on its basic
concepts. These tools include adap-
tive testing and appropriateness
measurement, among others.
Adaptive Testing
Adaptive testing presents a chal-
lenge for psychometricians because
adaptive tests must be constructed
to maximize the precision of ability
estimates for each test taker. CTT
methods are not very practical be-
cause the item parameters are
liriked to the sample for which the
parameters are calibrated; IRT pa-
rameters are sample-invariant.
Item parameters estimated from
one sample can be applied to ex-
aminees who were not in the cali-
bration sample. Another advantage
is that item and ability parameters
are on the same scale; this feature
allows for relatively simple algo-
rithms to be used to select items
that are best suited for each indi-
vidual. IRT models, along with the
Copyright © 1998 American Psychological Society
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development of low-cost desktop
computers, have made adaptive
testing practical. Adaptive testing
is now used extensively by ETS, the
U.S. Armed Services, and other li-
censure testing services. The popu-
larity of adaptive testing in such
high-volume, high-stakes testing
programs is a testament to the con-
fidence psychometricians have in
IRT.
Appropriateness Measurement
Appropriateness measurement
attempts to identify individuals
who do not fit the existing model
for responding to items (Levine &
Rubin, 1979). This technique can be
used to identify people who are
unmotivated, cheating, faking, or
otherwise answering in a way un-
like most other respondents. The
logic of appropriateness measure-
ment is that a model is estimated
on a group of respondents who can
be considered to be normal or
regular. Response patterns are
checked against this normative pat-
tern. Individuals whose patterns
do not conform to this model are
checked further. Additional inves-
tigation may reveal that the indi-
vidual cheated or did not take the
test seriously.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
There are several directions that
I predict future IRT research will
follow. On the technical side, more
sophisticated models will be devel-
oped to model more complex item
types. Some examples of this trend
can be seen in nonparametric mod-
els (e.g., Levine & Tsien, 1997) that
provide more flexibility than the
models discussed in this article,
models that incorporate speed of
responding (Roskam, 1997), and
multidimensional models for poly-
tomous data (Kelderman, 1997).
These models will provide re-
searchers even more modeling op-
tions.
Another important method-
ological research topic that needs
more attention is evaluation of
goodness of fit. IRT models, like
structural equation models, need to
be evaluated to see if the models fit
the data. In the structural equations
literature, there are many alterna-
tive goodness-of-fit indices, which
evaluate model fit with different
standards. In IRT, few options for
evaluating model fit exist. Issues
such as model modification indices
and influence statistics have yet to
be tackled in IRT.
The real contributions of IRT to
the field of psychology are yet to be
realized; the current challenge is to
use IRT models and related tools to
answer substantive problems.
Thissen and Steinberg (1988) dem-
onstrated that IRT models can be
used in conjunction with experi-
mental manipulations to test
whether such manipulations alter
the way respondents answer items.
In an extension of this methodol-
ogy, Highhouse and I used the 2PL
model to model responses to risky-
choice scenarios under a positive or
negative framing condition (i.e.,
when positive or negative conse-
quences of a decision, respectively,
were emphasized; Zickar & High-
house, 1998). Our results sup-
ported the traditional finding that
respondents in negative frames are
more likely to choose risky alterna-
tives than are respondents in posi-
tive frames; however, when plot-
ting IRFs for individual items
administered under both positive
and negative frames, we identified
that the effect of framing differed
across scenario types. The classic
Asian Disease problem (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1981), which is the
most frequently used risky-choice
scenario, had differences in dis-
crimination and location param-
eters across experimental condi-
tions, whereas other scenarios had
differences in location parameters
only across conditions. The de-
tailed description of the IRFs al-
lowed for fine distinctions between
items to be noted. This IRT analysis
suggested that the concept of fram-
ing needs to be reevaluated so that
these differences can be explained.
More than 10 years ago, Roskam
(1985) stated that "psychometric
modeling has been and still is pri-
marily developed as a technology
for measurement, with only loose
connections to substantive theoriz-
ing" (p. 9). With some exceptions,
Roskam's statement still holds true
today. With the increased accessi-
bility of IRT estimation programs
and the continued dissemination of
IRT research in substantive jour-
nals, this important methodologi-
cal technology should help ad-
vance the state of psychological
knowledge.
Notes
1. Address correspondence to
Michael J. Zickar, Department of Psy-
chology, Bowling Green State Univer-
sity, Bowling Green, OH 43403; e-mail:
mzickar@bgnet.bgsu.edu.
2. For more information about the
differences between CTT and IRT, the
reader is referred to Hambleton and
Jones (1993).
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The Social-Cognitive Model of
Transference: Experiencing Past
Relationships in the Present
Susan M. Andersen and Michele S. Berk^
Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, New York
Personal experience, as well as
psychological theory and research,
suggests that relationships with
significant individuals from one's
past may have a profound impact
on present-day relationships. The
notion that aspects of past relation-
ships may reemerge in later social
relations also forms the basis of the
clinical concept of transference
(Freud, 1912/1958; Sullivan, 1953),
which involves old issues in past
relationships emerging in new re-
lations, especially in analysis.
Transference in everyday life is the
focus of our research, even though
historically, transference has been
examined mainly theoretically and
as it pertains to psychotherapy
(e.g., Ehrenreich, 1989). Despite its
potential importance to social rela-
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tions in daily life, until recently,
little empirical work of any kind
has examined transference (al-
though see Luborsky & Crits-
Christoph, 1990).
In our work, we have developed
a social-cognitive model of transfer-
ence in everyday social relations
(Andersen & Glassman, 1996;
Andersen, Reznik, & Chen, 1997;
Chen & Andersen, in press; for re-
lated models, see Singer, 1988;
Wachtel, 1981; Westen, 1988). We
have shown that mental represen-
tations of significant others are
stored in memory, and that the
fundamental processes underlying
transference are the activation and
application of these representa-
tions to new people. Such activa-
tion and application occur particu-
larly when the new person
resembles the significant other.
This research provides the first ex-
perimental demonstrations of the
transference concept and is rel-
evant to a variety of related litera-
tures, ranging from those dealing
with relational schemas (Baldwin,
1992; Bugental, 1992) and attach-
ment theory (e.g., Bowlby, 1969;
Collins & Read, 1990; Hazan &
Shaver, 1987), to those concerned
with the self (e.g., Aron, Aron, Tu-
dor, & Nelson, 1991), close relation-
ships (Berscheid, 1994; Murray &
Holmes, 1993), and basic processes
in social cognition (Higgins, 1996;
Higgins & King, 1981).
In this article, we provide an
overview of this research. To begin,
we describe the basic tenets of the
model, highlighting its social-
cognitive and, clinical origins, and
also outline our experimental para-
digm. We then summarize the ex-
perimental research supporting the
model, which has demonstrated
transference as measured by infer-
ence and memory derived from
significant-other representations,
as well as by representation-
derived evaluation. We also review
research that shows the pervasive
impact of transference on interper-
sonal relations, summarizing find-
ings involving affect, motivation,
expectancies, interpersonal roles,
and self-definition.
THE SOCIAL-COGNITIVE
MODEL
OF TRANSFERENCE
Basic Assumptions
Research suggests that the acti-
vation and use of significant-other
Copyright © 1998 American Psychological Society
